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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses potential criteria to allocate international funding for adaptation to 
climate change, as a response to one of the main governance challenges of international 
adaptation funding - the prioritization of project proposals given scarce funding. Based on the 
review of the equity and cost-effectiveness literature and relevant policy documents, we 
identify three indicators for equity (vulnerability level, poverty, number of beneficiaries), and 
three indicators for cost-effectiveness (economic savings in absolute and relative terms, 
human lives saved). Applying these simple indicators to information provided in 16 project 
documents considered by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) in 2011, we find that projects 
approved by the AFB rank high according to one cost-effectiveness indicator (absolute 
economic savings), while they rather rank low according to all equity and further cost-
effectiveness indicators. Furthermore, we analyse whether ‘equity’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’ 
are two contradicting principles, or if ways can be found to reconcile both principles in 
multilateral adaptation finance. We conclude from both theory and the 16 analysed projects 
that a pure economic definition of cost-effectiveness is in contradiction with equity but trade-
offs between equity and cost-effectiveness can be limited if relative wealth savings, and other 
indicators, e.g. human health, are used as indicator for cost-effectiveness.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Multilateral climate adaptation finance has been one of the most dynamic and 
transformational elements within the whole international climate regime.  The outcomes of 
UN climate change negotiations in recent years contributed to a paradigm shift in 
international climate policy.  Climate change adaptation was recognised as equally important 
to climate change mitigation, which is formally the primary objective of the UNFCCC. 
However, explicit consideration of adaptation under the international regime is still in its 
infancy and it is often questioned if the needs of developing countries are adequately 
addressed (Pielke et al., 2007; Stern, 2007; Müller, 2008; Ayers and Dodman, 2010). 
 
Among the different multilateral funds that finance concrete adaptation projects and 
programmes in developing countries, the Adaptation Fund (AF) stands out because of two 
reasons: non-governmental funding sources and direct access for developing countries. 
First, the AF obtains its primary source of finance through a levy on projects under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), a market-based instrument under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
AF can be characterised as a form of ‘intergovernmental grant system’ mandated to 
(Ratajczak-Juszko and Feaver, 2011). Second, a novel element introduced by the fund is a 
‘direct access modality’ empowering governments of developing countries to directly submit 
proposals at the AF, without having to use a multilateral organization such as UNDP and the 
World Bank as intermediary. 
 
While in principle, “developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (AFB, 2010b) can access the AF, 
prioritization among eligible countries and projects remains unclear. While the decisions on 
the allocation of resources of the Fund “shall take into account” certain review criteria, e.g. 
vulnerability of host country, cost-effectiveness, consistency with national policies (see AFB, 
2012b), there are no clear guidelines at what threshold level these criteria are deemed to be 
fulfilled and how it is measured. Therefore, the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) secretariat has 
recommended that the AF should prepare a guidance document on how project proponents 
should describe the cost-effectiveness and consultative process part of the project proposals 
(AFB, 2011a) 
 
Apart from handling these general uncertainties on project eligibility criteria, the AFB 
currently has to consider how to deal with a situation where funding requests for eligible 
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projects exceed the amount of available funding (AFB, 2012a)1. Using the first-come-first-
serve criterion for allocation of funding, as currently applied, will become more and more 
questionable, given that this will provide an incentive to submit proposals as early as 
possible. 
 
Given the emerging need for the AFB to prioritize among project proposals, this paper 
considers which criteria could be used for prioritization. In the literature on adaptation policy, 
we find primarily a discussion of two potential goals or normative criteria of adaptation 
policy2: First, equity/fairness, or the equitable and fair treatment of countries and persons 
(e.g. Thomas and Twyman, 2005; Paavola and Adger, 2006; Dellink et al., 2009; Persson 
and Remling, forthcoming), and second, cost-effectiveness or efficiency, the generation of  
the a maximum benefit for a given level of resources (e.g. Mendelsohn, 2000; UNFCCC, 
2010a; Fankhauser and Burton, 2011; Stadelmann et al., 2011). To date, only Persson and 
Remling (forthcoming) have both discussed efficiency and equity rationales for allocation of 
AF resources (see Figure 1). However, they have not analyzed if efficiency/cost-
effectiveness and equity are contradictory or complementary principles, which is an open 
debate in other policy fields (see e.g. Okun, 1975; Le Grand, 1990; Blank, 2002; Dietz and 
Atkinson, 2010) 
 
                                               
1
 This situation has occurred as the AFB decided to cap the funding flowing through multilateral 
organizations to 50% of all AF funding in December 2011. 
2
 Further normative criteria for climate change adaptation are legitimacy (Adger et al., 2005), and 
sustainability (Eriksen et al., 2011). For simplicity, we focus on the equity and cost-effectiveness here. 
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Figure 1:  Possible rationales for allocation of Adaptation Fund resources
Source: Persson & Remling (forthcoming)
 
 
Given the importance of equity a
will assess potential indicators for both equity and cost
useful as criteria for prioritization of adaptation funding. As a further step, we will analyze if 
equity and cost-effectiveness are contradictory principles and if policymakers will face trade
offs if they want to prioritize adaptation projects considering both goals, or if we find 
synergies. We conduct our analysis on both a theoretical as well as an 
empirical part, we analyze data from the AF as major multilateral funding institution. We use 
16 adaptation funding project proposals from the year 2011 to analyze how well projects 
approved by the AFB de facto 
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assess whether aiming at both equity and cost
case of the 16 projects. Given the 
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theoretical analysis. 
                                               
3
 The Adaptation Fund Board does not “reject” project proposals but rather sends proposals 
the project proponent to reconfigure the project
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2 Methodology and selection of data 
 
Each of the following chapters will have the same structure: definition of the key terms 
(equity and cost-effectiveness), short review of the literature, and analysis of relevant AFB 
documents and finally analysis of concrete AF projects.  
 
For the last step, we have selected a sample of 16 out of 27 project documents considered 
by the AFB in 2011, covering projects discussed at AFB13 and AFB15. While the selection 
has not been random, these 16 projects represent 80% of approved funding and 75% of all 
implementing agencies submitting projects in 2011 (see Table 1). The project documents 
were downloaded from the “AFB meeting documents” section on the AFB (2011c, 2011b) 
webpage. A full list of projects in the sample, with implementing agencies, stated number of 
beneficiaries and funding amounts is provided in Appendix 1.  
 
Table 1: Analyzed projects compared to all AFB projects considered in 2011 
 
 
Considered by AFB in 2011 Approved by AFB in 2011 
 
# of 
proposals 
Funding 
(Million 
USD) 
# of  Imple-
menting 
agencies 
# of 
proposals 
Funding 
(Million 
USD) 
# of  Imple-
menting 
agencies 
ALL 27 187.1 8 13 85.6 4 
SAMPLE 16 117.0 6 10 68.1 4 
% 59% 63% 75% 77% 80% 100% 
 
 
3 Equity when allocating Adaptation Fund resources 
 
Equity as a principle for allocating scarce funds is complicated to define, in general. An 
additional complication in the case of the AF is the fact that we are dealing with equity, or 
distributive justice, at two levels; between countries and between projects.  
 
It is currently unclear which level matters more in the allocation of funding, as some review 
criteria in the Operation Guidelines are equity-related but their application is less straight 
forward. We return to this issue below, but first we review alternative interpretations of equity 
in the theoretical literature. 
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The relational property of equity has been captured in social psychology, primarily equity 
theory as developed by Adams (1965). This theory understands equity as distribution of 
resources perceived as fair by both relational partners. It posits that an individual will 
consider he/she is fairly treated when the following condition holds: 
	 	
	 	

 	 	
 	 	
 
 
Translating this theory to the adaptation finance context, we could consider developing 
countries eligible for adaptation finance as ‘individuals’ in this case4. Having a common pool 
of resources to share, they would arguably only perceive the allocation of funds5 (outcomes) 
as equitable in case they are uniformly proportional to some condition (input). In the case of 
the AF, this condition is most often thought of as level of vulnerability (Klein, 2009; 
Horstmann, 2011; Klein and Möhner, 2011).67 We shall see below that the operationalisation 
and measurement of level of vulnerability is the most common problem when applying equity 
principles and has challenged the AFB. It should also be emphasised that perceived fairness 
of a particular distribution of resources depends not only on the transfers and their underlying 
principle, but also on the procedures followed, e.g. with reference to ensuring 
representativeness and consistency in decision-making (Leventhal, 1980; Adger et al., 
2007). Furthermore, not only intra- but also intergenerational justice is to be considered in 
the context of adaptation (Tol et al., 2004) In this paper we focus on distributive and 
intragenerational rather than procedural and intergenerational justice, however. The design 
of the AF makes it very likely that procedural justice can be achieved, at least at an 
international and national level, and intergenerational justice is a topic beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 
Approaching equity from a normative rather than positive perspective, some alternative 
principles have been developed in political theory. Duus-Otterström and Stripple (2011) 
review three alternative principles of justice in relation to allocating adaptation finance, which 
                                               
4
 This country-level focus of our equity discussion is related to the structure of international relations 
and somehow neglects that there are relevant distributional issues between people living in one 
country, and that an equitable allocation of funds to countries does not assure equitable distribution of 
these funds within each country, see the discussion below. 
5
 One could also see “increased utility” and not “allocation of funds” as outcome. For simplicity, we 
assume a linear relation here. 
6
 The primacy of vulnerability as the basis for allocating funds can be seen in the decision (1/CMP.3) 
establishing the Adaptation Fund, where ‘particular vulnerability’ is defined as the key eligibility 
criterion for developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol to receive funds. Vulnerability is further 
mentioned in other COP decisions and ‘level of vulnerability’ stated as the first in a series of variables 
that should be taken into account when allocation decisions are made, according to the Strategic 
Priorities, Policies and Guidelines of the Adaptation Fund. 
7
 Note that proportionality is not applicable if we interpret ‘particular vulnerability’ as a binary category 
rather than an interval variable. 
 Equity and cost-effectiveness – are they friends or foes?                                                                  Page 8 of 31 
 
we consider here at the level of countries rather than projects or individuals. First, equality, if 
referring to (i) equal funds to all countries, would not change current inequity. If referring to 
(ii) an allocation so that all countries become equally (in)vulnerable, it is seen as 
unrealistically costly or flawed in that it could be interpreted as, in principle, allowing for a 
‘levelling-up’8 of vulnerability. The applicability of this second interpretation of equality (i.e., 
equal vulnerability) is limited in the context of the AF since the allocation is not a one-off 
event, but a series of decisions informed by previous decisions, and since time lags in 
affecting vulnerability levels would make it difficult to determine when vulnerability is equal. 
Furthermore, a ‘levelling-up’ scenario does not appear to be politically acceptable. 
 
Second, the leximin principle (see also Kolm, 1996; Paavola and Adger, 2006) avoids the 
‘levelling-up’ problem, by stipulating a step-wise move down the vulnerability ladder; 
resources are first allocated so that the worst-off become as well off as the second-to-worst 
off, and if resources remain, as well off as the third-to-worst off, etc. Vulnerability would thus 
be the currency also for applying this principle. Duus-Otterström and Stripple claim that this 
principle, while appealing, would be prohibitively resource-demanding. Arguably, though, this 
depends on the choice of vulnerability indicator/index and the incidence of countries on that 
scale. Existing indices (see below) suggest that country scores are relatively dispersed, 
which means that the initial steps up the ladder need not be prohibitively costly, in principle9. 
Ratajczak-Juszko and Feaver (2011) propose an approach for the Adaptation Fund that 
would not disburse to the most vulnerable to let them catch-up (as in leximin) but would 
‘level-down’ vulnerability in a series of repeated allocation decisions. Arguing that equity 
should be directly related to ‘need’ (vulnerability) and inversely related to ‘capacity’ (adaptive 
capacity), they propose the following formula for determining transfers from the Fund: 
     
Where TRi is the transfer from the AF to country i, Ni is need due to vulnerability, and Ci is 
capacity to adapt. With this reasoning, funding would thus be proportional to ‘net 
vulnerability’. 
 
The third candidate principle reviewed by Duus-Otterström and Stripple (2011) is 
utilitarianism, which stipulates the maximization of utility or ‘happiness’ as moral criterion for 
governing the society (Mill, 1863), a principle that has become the foundation of ‘economic 
efficiency’. As commonly criticised (see e.g. Parfit, 1997), it does not distinguish between 
                                               
8
 This means that vulnerability is not reduced (which one would expect to be a goal for adaptation 
funds) but that in some countries it would be increased.  
9
 To illustrate, reducing the vulnerability of one country (e.g. Guinea Bissau) to the level of the second 
most vulnerable (e.g. Honduras) would most likely cost less than a scenario of reducing the 
vulnerability of ten equally vulnerable countries to the level of the eleventh country. 
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benefits accruing to the most vulnerable and those accruing to less vulnerable actors and is 
therefore often seen as inequitable. Furthermore, utility is often measured by willingness-to-
pay, which means that benefits of poorer and, therefore, often more vulnerable countries are 
underrepresented. This could be addressed, however, through weighting of benefits 
according to the vulnerability of countries or communities.10  
 
Clearly, all principles rely on the currency of vulnerability and the same operationalisation 
and measurement challenges are faced. The construction of vulnerability indicators or 
indices, measured at national or sub-national levels, has been strongly contested in the 
academic community. For example, Hinkel (2011) and Klein (2009) argue that vulnerability is 
a too complex and subjective phenomenon to lend itself to ‘measurement’ and comparison 
across countries. Equally important, they argue that it is misleading that science could help 
develop and aggregate indicators, since it is an inherently political issue. Füssel (2010) 
argues that a generic index would not be appropriate, whilst sector- or hazard-specific criteria 
could help guide funding allocation. However, experiences with mitigation have shown that it 
was possible to agree on indicators such as Global Warming Potentials with a specific time 
horizon even under a consensus rule, and thus an agreement on vulnerability indicators 
seems not generally impossible. 
 
Researchers have proposed country indices for vulnerability and adaptive capacity (see Buys 
et al., 2009; Barr et al., 2010; Global Adaptation Institute, 2011; Wheeler, 2011). Comparing 
the first three indices for ‘impact vulnerability’, they all include change in agricultural yield and 
exposure to sea level rise, whereas two of the three include health impacts and population 
sensitivity to disasters. In addition to their impact vulnerability index, Barr et al. (2010) have 
also developed an ‘adaptive capacity’ index which includes six indicators related to age 
structure of the population, access to credit, income inequality, governance, literacy and 
education rates. Our initial analysis suggests that country scores are not particularly robust 
across indices, but this requires further research (Persson and Remling, forthcoming). As 
further challenge when allocating funding, these vulnerability indices have been calculated 
only at a country level. In relation to the issue of the two levels with which the AF is 
concerned, national level and project level, it is unclear whether the observed variation 
between country scores is higher or lower than variation between regions within a country.  
 
                                               
10
 Note that (Duus-Otterström and Stripple, 2011) argue that an alternative principle to weighted 
utilitarianism is prioritarianism, whereby the weighting is not only instrumental to maximising net 
welfare but the weights have a moral priority.  
 Equity and cost-effectiveness – are they friends or foes?                                                                  Page 10 of 31 
 
The second major problem is thus whether the AF should aim for equity among countries, or 
should it aim for equity among projects or sub-national entities? The principles above 
assume that there is only one type of worthy recipient to be compared (for example, 
countries) rather than two types, or levels, or recipients (for example, countries and sub-
national projects). 
 
Given these major challenges – various equity definitions, vulnerability indices and two levels 
- which equity-related principles did the AFB use so far? Starting from the eligibility criteria on 
the country level11 specific considerations are to be made when allocating resources among 
eligible countries, see Article 16 of the Operation Guidelines (AFB, 2010b), among which we 
find three criteria that are clearly equity-related12: (a) Level of vulnerability [...], (c) Ensuring 
access to the fund in a balanced and equitable manner [...] and (g) adaptive capacity to the 
adverse effects of climate change.”   
 
In relation to the first equity-related principle, the ‘level of vulnerability’, so far, the AFB has 
chosen to not define vulnerability more precisely, including operationalising it into indicators 
or an index. The issue has been discussed at several meetings. In June 2010, the AFB 
concluded that “no one measure could be applied and the vulnerability of a country had to be 
determined by each country itself” (AFB, 2010c). Horstmann (2011) argues that it is unlikely 
that the AFB members would adopt a more precise definition which may exclude countries in 
their constituencies and that the current situation where it is up to the country itself to 
interpret vulnerability is actually in line with the country-driven approach, another principle 
stipulated for the AF. In the absence of a standard methodology, it is thus not clear whether 
or how the AFB applies the ‘particular vulnerability’ (binary category) or ‘level of vulnerability’ 
(interval) criteria. The problem is further confounded by the fact that the review process and 
its documentation are not open to the public. 
 
The second equity-related principle stipulated for the AF is ‘access to the fund in a balanced 
and equitable manner for eligible countries’.13 This principle has been operationalised to 
some extent. A document on ‘initial funding priorities’ was under discussion in the AFB for a 
considerable amount of time. An interim version considered regions, LDC/SIDS status and 
the status as ODA recipient as criteria to decide on the allocation of funds. In the end, a 
                                               
11
 See Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol and Decision 10/CP.7. 
12
 We consider the following two criteria as rather effectiveness than equity-oriented (d) Lessons 
learned in project and programme design and implementation to be captured […¨(e) Securing regional 
co-benefits to the extent possible, where applicable”, while a further criterion “b) Level of urgency and 
risks arising from delay” is seen here as captured by an adequate vulnerability assessment 
13
 See Decision 5/CMP.2 
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uniform cap of $10 million per country was set.14 This principle is a weak version of the equity 
principle ‘equality’, in the sense that all entities should have the same maximum amount of 
resources available. 
 
Finally, the strategic priorities of the AF state that ‘special attention shall be given by eligible 
Parties to the particular needs of the most vulnerable communities’.15 This ‘priority’ 
addresses sub-national equity in some sense, but is clearly not a requirement to demonstrate 
that the project will benefit the most vulnerable community in a particular country. Nor does it 
give any guidance on how community-level vulnerability should be compared across 
countries. 
 
Against this background of theory and AFB practices, we formulate here a series of simple 
and operational equity indicators to demonstrate how they correspond with funding decisions 
actually taken. We describe how they apply to the level of countries and/or individuals. 
 
The first principle is equality, which can be both understood as equality between countries 
and equality between individuals. First, we look at equality between countries, in the sense 
that all developing countries get an equal amount of funding. As stated above, this principle 
can be considered inequitable when initial conditions (e.g. population, national income, 
vulnerability) vary, which is most often the case. Since the AFB has adopted a uniform 
national cap of $10 million and project proposals submitted so far ask for similar amounts 
(between 5-10 million, see Appendix 1), we can argue that this principle is de facto followed 
to a considerable extent. We examine below, though, whether funding decisions made 
(implicitly) adhere to other equity principles simultaneously. 
 
While the equal funding per country can be justified on the basis that countries (rather than 
individuals) are Parties to the UNFCCC and that they are equal Parties, a variation of this 
principle could be country funding based on equal funding per capita, which is a proxy for 
equality between individuals. Equality could then be estimated by the variance of the number 
of beneficiaries per dollar of funding between countries, the lower the variance, the more 
equal the funding will be distributed. Given that national population of the eligible countries 
differs by 5-6 orders of magnitude, it is clear that this principle would imply a significantly 
different allocation compared with country-level equal funds. Minimizing the variance of the 
                                               
14
 Decision B.13/23 
15
 See Strategic priorities, policies and guidelines of the Adaptation Fund approved by the CMP 
(Decision 1/CMP.4). The wording of “vulnerable communities” can also be interpreted as a 
replacement of “vulnerable countries”, on which no political agreement has been reached. 
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number of beneficiaries can be contested on several grounds, e.g. a tendency to spread out 
resources so thinly that there will not be any significant benefit, potential mismatch between 
number of beneficiaries and real benefits, or the low data quality on beneficiaries16.  While 
this equality indicator does somehow disregard the criterion of ‘particular vulnerability’ of 
countries, it is already a bit closer to vulnerability than equal funding per country.  
 
The second principle, we formulate here is support for the most vulnerable, in that more 
vulnerable countries should have priority access to the Adaptation Fund. This principle is 
inspired by the equality (achieving equality of vulnerability) and leximin principles above. 
Strict application of these is not possible due to the time lag in observing vulnerability and the 
fact that the national cap of $10 million prohibits differentiation of grants awarded. We test 
this vulnerability principle by taking the vulnerability index of Barr et al. (2010) as an example 
and by doing a sensitivity analysis by applying two other indices (Buys et al., 2009; Global 
Adaptation Institute, 2011).  
 
Using vulnerability indices imply several problems. First, these indices do not cover all 
eligible countries; the Barr index covers at least all but one country in our sample. Second, 
the variation in country rankings on the three vulnerability indices suggests that they are 
indeed sensitive to choice of indicator and data used. Third, the vulnerability indices are very 
difficult to understand for the general public and even policymakers, as most of them are 
composed of several sub-indicators. Given these challenges of vulnerability indices, we also 
apply the equality principle in relation to GDP per capita, assuming that allocating funding to 
the poorest countries will reduce inequality. While the GDP per capita indicator falls short of 
including all relevant assets of individuals and is also a sub-optimal proxy for climate 
vulnerability, it is considered relevant here as a simple, well understandable indicator for 
poverty and low development, which is relevant in the AFB context where LDC status has 
been discussed as a basis for priority access17. 
 
Table 2 shows which projects in the sample would have to be selected according the three18 
proposed equity criteria. Some projects are consistently among the five highest (e.g. Mali, 
                                               
16
 First, the number of beneficiaries says nothing about the level, quality and directness of benefits, 
which make comparison difficult. For example, an ecosystem-based adaptation may indirectly benefit 
many thousands of users of a resource, but in a marginal way, while some adaptations could directly 
ensure livelihoods of a smaller group of individuals. Second, the estimates of number of beneficiaries 
reported in proposals are uncertain and no consistent methodology is used.    
17
 See decision B.13/23 
18
 We neglect “equality between countries” here as this would simply mean that all countries receive 
the same level of funding. In this sense, the principle is not useful for prioritization of project proposal.  
 Equity and cost-effectiveness – are they friends or foes?                                                                  Page 13 of 31 
 
Mauritania) or five lowest ranked projects (e.g. Belize, Cook Islands, Mauritius and Uruguay), 
while others have ambiguous rankings. 
 
Table 2: Ranking of Adaptation Fund projects according to equity indicators 
 
Equity 
indicator 
Support for the 
most vulnerable 
Support for the 
poorest countries 
Equal funds per 
capita Appro-
ved by 
the 
AFB? Measure 
Vulnerability index, 
rank (1 = most 
vulnerable) 
Low GDP per capita No. of beneficiaries  / k$ of funding 
 Absolute Value RANK 
Absolute 
Value RANK 
Absolute 
Value RANK  
Belize 78 12 4349 12 0.8 13 No 
Cook Islands -  12325 15 1.1 12 Yes 
Ecuador 57 10 4352 13 26.8 4 Yes 
Egypt 40 6 2922 9 13.7 9 Yes 
Eritrea 3 1 473 2 9.9 10 Yes 
Georgia 101 14 3098 11 37.6 2 Yes 
Madagascar 45 8 428 1 20.5 6 Yes 
Mali 30 4 796 4 46.9 1 No 
Mauritania 1 8 2 1227 5 -  No 
Mauritania 2 8 2 1227 5 37.5 3 No 
Mauritius 96 13 8519 14 0.3 15 Yes 
Papua New G. 44 7 1712 8 17.2 7 No 
Samoa 76 11 3049 10 6.9 11 Yes 
Solomon 
Islands 56 9 1457 7 22.6 5 Yes 
Tanzania 38 5 550 3 16.3 8 Yes 
Uruguay 128 15 14672 16 0.5 14 Yes 
Source Barr et al. 2010 IMF (2011) Project documents   
 
 
 
Has the AFB rather approved projects that our proposed equity principles would suggest for 
funding? It seems the opposite has happened. The Spearman rank-ordered correlation 
coefficient between funding approval and equity principles (Table 3) shows that the AFB has, 
at least in 2011, rather selected projects in countries with low vulnerability (so a high 
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vulnerability rank), high income per capita19 and a low number of beneficiaries. However, the 
sample is small, so only the negative correlation between vulnerability and approval is 
significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, the negative correlation between vulnerability and 
approval does not depend on the index chosen; according to all indices, the AFB has rather 
selected projects in countries with low vulnerability (see Appendix 3) 
 
Table 3: Correlation between project approval and equity criteria  
 
 Approval  Vulnerability 
rank  (Barr 
et al. 2010) 
GDP per 
capital 
No. of 
beneficiaries 
Approval 1.00    
 
Vulnerability rank (Barr et 
al. 2010) (low=vulnerable) 0.44* 1.00  
 
 
GDP per capita 0.20 0.81*** 1.00  
 
No. of beneficiaries 
 
-0.23 -0.38* -0.51* 1.00 
 
Spearman product moment correlation coefficients 
* = significant at 0.1 level, ** = significant at 0.05 level, *** = significant at 0.01 level, 
N=16 (except for GDP (N=16) 
 
 
This equity analysis has severe limitations. Apart from the selection of equity indicators, 
which imply important value judgements, we have a general limitation connected to the level 
of analysis: the indicators applied are on a national level but it would be relevant here to 
capture the issue of sub-national equity, or equity between individuals, considering that 
allocation is primarily made to projects rather than countries and that attention should be paid 
to the needs of ‘most vulnerable communities’. Note that comparison of projects, based on 
the vulnerability of the targeted communities, within a country is in a sense delegated to the 
national governments of eligible countries, who are effectively responsible for making sure 
that the national cap is used in the best way (according to criteria of their choice). The AFB 
can instead compare projects across countries. The vulnerability principle could be applied in 
theory, but currently there is a lack of comparable vulnerability indices and data at sub-
national level. A utilitarian approach with weighted benefits could also be applied in theory, 
but lack of quantified benefit estimates in the proposals prevents this. Some basis for 
assigning weights would also need to be developed, such as differential vulnerability of the 
target communities.  
 
                                               
19
 The correlation between approval and GDP per capita in the project country even persists when we 
extend the sample to all 27 project documents considered by the 2011. 
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4 Cost-Effectiveness when allocating Adaptation Fund 
resources 
 
Cost-effectiveness is a measure for the extent to which a policy can achieve an objective per 
unit of social costs - a common policy indicator in the climate change mitigation field (Gupta 
et al., 2007). Like its mitigation counterpart, also adaptation policy has to correctly assess 
costs but the real challenge lies in the determination of the “effectiveness” part, for two 
reasons.  
 
The first challenge in assessing “cost-effectiveness” is that uncertainty prevails in the extent 
of climate change (Solomon et al., 2007), its impact on human and ecosystems (Parry et al., 
2007; Parry et al., 2009) and the benefits of adaptation measures (Adger et al., 2007). This 
means that some interventions may prove to be more or less beneficial than anticipated, or a 
measure may even have a negative impact, implying “maladaptation” (Barnett and O'Neill, 
2010). Therefore, flexible approaches and soft measures with long-term benefits may be 
most appropriate for adaptation (Hallegatte, 2009; Fankhauser and Burton, 2011). 
Unfortunately, the benefits of soft and flexible interventions are difficult to predict. The 
second issue is that “effectiveness” indicators for adaptation have not yet been agreed 
(Adger et al., 2007; UNFCCC, 2010b). Typically, the (avoided) climate impacts are quantified 
for adaptation interventions, both in welfare terms (e.g. Tol et al., 1998) or non-monetary 
terms such as crop yields (e.g. Lobell et al., 2008), exposed population or health (e.g. 
Costello et al., 2009).  
 
Given the missing agreement on cost-effectiveness measurement in the academic literature, 
political definitions in AFB documents may help. The AFB (2010a) has, similar to other 
development agencies, set up a result framework, where it defines desired outputs, 
outcomes, impact and goal of adaptation interventions20. The reasoning is that immediate 
project outputs should lead to short- and mid-term outcomes and finally to impacts and 
achievement of the goal. Given that outputs (e.g. trained people) and outcomes (e.g. built 
dams) are intermediary results, the measure ultimately of interest from an cost-effectiveness 
point of view is the “impact”. The AFB has very vaguely defined the desired impact as 
“increased resiliency at the community, national, and regional levels to climate variability and 
change” without further defining an indicator for it. Also the goal of the AFB interventions 
                                               
20
 Following the standard OECD (2002) definitions, outputs are the “products and services which result 
from the completion of activities”, outcomes are “intended or achieved short-term and medium-term 
effects of an intervention’s output” and impacts are longer term results of interventions.  
 Equity and cost-effectiveness – are they friends or foes?                                                                  Page 16 of 31 
 
does not reveal much more, apart from the focus on particularly vulnerable countries21. The 
AFB project proposal form (AFB, 2012c) and the project review criteria (AFB, 2012b) are 
even less specific by mentioning "Does the project provide economic, social and 
environmental benefits, with particular reference to the most vulnerable communities?“ and 
“Is the project cost-effective?” These very generic sentences have led to a very 
heterogeneous way of describing cost-effectiveness in the 16 projects we assessed. 
 
We understand cost-effectiveness of adaptation projects, here, in terms of the ultimate effect 
of AFB projects per USD invested, to improve people’s well-being by helping them to cope 
with climate change. Therefore, we are not primarily interested in intermediate outcomes 
(e.g. capacity building, regulatory change) of AFB projects themselves but in their ultimate 
contribution to improve well-being of persons and countries22. 
 
As neither the academic literature nor AFB policy documents have been clear which indicator 
captures cost-effectiveness of interventions, we will rely on a set of three cost-effectiveness 
indicators that try to proxy cost-effectiveness: absolute wealth, relative wealth and health 
saved per USD of spending (as proposed by Stadelmann et al., 2011). While these three 
indicators involve value judgments and simplify the overall set of potential adaptive 
benefits23, we can argue that they reflect the most important features in both the literature 
(monetary and non-monetary benefits) as well as AFB documents (vulnerability24; economic, 
social and environmental benefits), as we will explain in the following.  
  
The first indicator is Saved Wealth (absolute), defined as the monetised assets saved by 
adaptation interventions. Saved Wealth reflects economic value as the standard indicator 
used by economists to conduct cost-benefit analysis of adaptation interventions (Fankhauser 
and Tol, 1998; ECAWG, 2009; Moench et al., 2009). It also represents the “economic 
benefits” demanded in the AFB’s project review criteria (AFB, 2012b). The philosophical 
background of measuring benefits through monetary terms is the stipulation in Utilitarianism 
that maximizing the sum of personal utilities is the desirable social goal, while utility can be 
                                               
21
 “Assist developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of concrete adaptation projects and programs, 
in order to implement climate resilient measures” (AFB, 2010a) 
22
 Given that both climatic hazards and human development are uncertain, estimating ultimate cost-
effectiveness will be very challenging. If it proves to be impossible to estimate a range for cost-
effectiveness, then reliance on outcome indicators may be preferable. 
23
 It is clear that ultimately a political decision will be needed on the indicators for “adaptive benefits”, 
whether is on the international, the national or the community level. How this decision process shall be 
governed is to be explored. 
24
 One may simply see “reducing vulnerability” as main “cost-effectiveness” indicator (see discussion 
on equity and cost-effectiveness synergies below). However, both the literature and AFB documents 
mention cost-effectiveness indicators beyond vulnerability, so we will keep the analysis broader. 
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measured by willingness to pay. Using Saved Wealth as the only indicator would have two 
major drawbacks: first, non-monetised benefits, including some of the social25 and 
environmental benefits asked for by the AFB (2012b) would not be included. Second, 
willingness to pay is dependent on the existing wealth level, so Absolute Wealth Saved will 
probably favour countries with high income and high capacity to adapt and, therefore, is not 
representing the most vulnerable countries. Therefore, two other indicators are used: Saved 
Health and Saved Wealth (relative)26. 
 
The second indicator is Saved Health, measured in Disability Adjusted Life Years Saved 
(DALYs), an indicator systematically utilized by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2010). 
The DALY indicator is mainly used because monetization of saved lives is ethically 
challenging and has sparked intensive debate in the past (Fankhauser and Tol, 1998). 
Already Fearnside (1998) suggested separating human lives and property values when 
assessing climate change impacts. Furthermore, Saved Health may be a good proxy for 
reduced vulnerability and it does not differ between lives of rich and poor persons.  
 
The third indicator is Saved Wealth in relative terms (percentage of personal wealth saved, 
multiplied with the number of beneficiaries). The idea is that relative wealth saved can be 
used as a proxy for reducing vulnerability as AFB funding will have a higher impact on 
relative wealth in less affluent countries with a more vulnerable population27.  
 
Applying these indicators – Wealth Saved (absolute and relative) and Health Saved - to our 
sample of 16 AFB project proposals (see Table 4), we see that the cost-effectiveness 
indicators are not always contradictory as some projects perform very well according to 
several indicators. E.g. the Solomon Islands project leads the saved wealth ranking, both in 
absolute and relative terms, while the Ecuador project tops the health benefits ranking and 
ranks second in absolute wealth terms. Unfortunately, most project documents do not include 
data on health and absolute wealth benefits, and only refer to number of beneficiaries, from 
which approximate relative wealth savings can be derived. We assumed here that 7.5% of 
the wealth of targeted beneficiaries can be saved, if no details were given. This assumption 
is based on the median value (7.7%; the mean is 15%) of relative wealth savings calculated 
                                               
25
 While utilitarianism would argue that Saved Wealth already incorporates social benefits, we can 
assume that the AFB has further social benefits in mind, e.g. equitable distribution and health. 
26
 Actually, Stadelmann et al. (2011) propose to use environmental and cultural no-harm criteria to 
incorporate more of the social and environmental impacts but we omit the analysis of theses sub-
indicator here for simplicity. 
27
 An absolute wealth assessment treats $100 of wealth increase for a millionaire and a subsistence 
farmer the same, while a relative assessment captures the relative importance of assets for coping 
with climate change much better. 
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by dividing numbers for absolute wealth savings by beneficiaries and average per capita 
income in the country.  Therefore, the most informative ranking can be made on the relative 
wealth indicator. 
 
It has to be noted that the rankings depend on information provided in the project proposals. 
The proponent may have calculated the numbers using different assumptions and models. 
Reliable numbers would have to be based on common calculation methodologies or models, 
which are not available in case of the AF guidelines. Therefore, the ranking presented here 
does not necessarily correspond to the real cost-effectiveness; it only presents the 
information that was available to AFB members at the point of decision making. 
 
Table 4: Ranking of Adaptation Fund projects according to cost-effectiveness indicators  
 
Cost-effective-
ness indicator Saved Health 
Saved wealth – 
absolute 
Saved wealth – 
relative 
Appro-
ved by 
the 
AFB? Measure DALYs / k$ 
$ of income saved 
(annually) / $ 
No. of yearly 
incomes saved / $ 
Source Project documents Project documents Project documents  
 
Absolut
e Value RANK 
Absolut
e Value RANK 
Absolut
e Value RANK  
Belize - - 2.0 3 0.5 10 No 
Cook Islands - - - - 0.1 13 Yes 
Ecuador 121 1 3.4 2 1.3 5 Yes 
Egypt - -   0.7 7 Yes 
Eritrea - - 0.3 8 0.6 8 Yes 
Georgia - - 0.4 5 0.1 12 Yes 
Madagascar - - - - 2.1 3 Yes 
Mali - - - - 2.3 2 No 
Mauritania 1 - - - - - - No 
Mauritania 2 - - - - 1.9 4 No 
Mauritius - - 0.3 6 0.04 15 Yes 
Papua New G. - - - - 0.9 6 No 
Samoa - - - - 0.3 11 Yes 
Solomon Islands - - 6.5 1 4.4 1 Yes 
Tanzania - - 0.3 7 0.5 9 Yes 
Uruguay - - 0.7 4 0.05 14 Yes 
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The correlation table (Table 5) indicates that the AFB has rather approved project proposals 
from countries with high absolute wealth savings, while projects with high relative wealth 
savings have been disadvantaged. The correlations of the Saved Health indicator rely on 
data from only one project, so it is not possible to make any general statement.  
 
Table 5: Correlation between project approval & cost-effectiveness criteria  
 
 Approval  Saved 
Wealth 
absolute 
Saved 
Wealth 
relative  
Saved 
Health 
Approval 1.00    
 
Saved Wealth absolute 0.44* 1.00   
 
Saved Wealth relative -0.14 -0.05 1.00  
 
Saved Health (data from 
only 1 project!) 0.20 0.39 0.20 1.00 
 
N=16, Spearman rank-ordered correlation coefficients. * = significant at 0.1 level, ** = significant at 0.05 level, *** 
= significant at 0.01 level, 
 
 
The analysis as just applied certainly has several limitations: we have omitted other potential 
cost-effectiveness criteria (e.g. environmental benefits) and the analysis relies on data from 
project documents, which are not rigorously verified.   
 
 
5 Equity and cost-effectiveness – are they friends or foes? 
 
Traditionally, equity and cost-effectiveness28 are seen as two principles or goals that are in 
contradiction and create trade-offs (Blank, 2002). Actually, there are two types of trade-offs 
between equity and cost-effectiveness (Le Grand, 1990): a value trade-off, so human beings 
may value one principle as normatively important and the other not29, and a production trade-
off, so a social outcome may be favourable from the perspective of one principle but not from 
the other. 
 
                                               
28
 We will use the term cost-effectiveness (so policy effectiveness per costs) here, even if the literature 
about trade-offs with equity uses the terms “efficiency” (so economic benefits per costs).We can use 
this swap of concepts as the ideas / arguments are basically the same for both concepts. 
29 This value trade-off does not always exist: in the case of environmental policy making in the UK, 
Dietz and Atkinson (2010) found that respondents value both effectiveness and equity. 
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In our case, we will focus on the production trade-off between equity and cost-effectiveness, 
so we examine whether specific outcomes of adaptation funding are equally favourable from 
an equity and cost-effectiveness point of view.  
 
While Okun (1975) argues that there are substantial production trade-offs between equity 
and efficiency, we may argue that multilateral adaptation funding could be a case where the 
trade-off is low: First, the costs of administration and behavioural change due to equity-
related redistribution (Okun, 1975)  are less relevant in the AFB context, as multilateral 
adaptation funding is by its nature a redistributive procedure from North to South30, so all the 
mentioned costs of striving for equity may, at least partially, also occur if the AFB strives for 
cost-effectiveness. Moreover, adaptation funding incorporates at least two types of 
redistribution, for which Blank (2002) expects low trade-offs: “transfers to populations with no 
capacity to change their behaviour”31 and subsidies for “commodities […] that function as 
long-term investments and create future income gains32.”  
 
Finally, we may also question on a conceptual level whether equity and cost-effectiveness 
are necessarily contradictory in the context of multilateral adaptation funding. We have seen 
that many potential equity indicators somehow measure the “vulnerability” of countries. On 
the cost-effectiveness side, some indicators approximate “the reduction in vulnerability” to 
measure the effectiveness part of cost-effectiveness. Therefore, in many cases, the only 
difference between equity and cost-effectiveness indicators is that the equity indicators 
measure the potential for vulnerability reductions, while cost-effectiveness measures the 
actual vulnerability reduction achieved. In an extreme case, we even have “achieved 
reduction of vulnerability” both as equity and cost-effectiveness indicator, so there should not 
be any trade-off. This argument is similar to the one of Le Grand (1990) who argues that in 
some cases there is only seemingly a trade-off because “cost-effectiveness” itself is not the 
primary objective. Summing up our theoretical discussion, we may expect low trade-offs or 
even some synergies between equity and cost-effectiveness.  
 
The level of trade-off will also certainly depend on the indicators chosen. Table 6 shows 
which pairs of indicators are likely to indicate trade-offs between equity and cost-
                                               
30
 It should be noted that many developing countries and scholars see adaptation funding more as 
“compensation” for losses due to greenhouse gas emissions of Northern countries. 
31
 This example of Blank is similar to the argument of Fankhauser and Burton (2011) that building a 
minimum level of adaptive capacity everywhere (“equitably”)  may be an efficient way of spending 
adaptation funding. 
32
 In the adaptation case, several of such commodities with long-term benefits are subsidized (e.g. 
infrastructure investment, climate knowledge). 
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effectiveness and which may indicate synergies. Starting with absolute wealth as cost-
effectiveness indicator, we may except likely trade-offs with all equity indicators: absolute 
wealth savings will likely occur in wealthier countries with low vulnerability, high income per 
capita and more dollars needed to make one person benefit from a programme. The second 
cost-effectiveness indicator, relative wealth, is likely to be in close correspondence with 
equity indicators. This is because relative wealth savings are more likely in poorer countries, 
which also tend to be more vulnerable (see correlations in Appendix 333). Furthermore, as the 
relative savings indicator measures the number of personal livelihoods that can be saved, it 
should also be positively related to the number of beneficiaries. Finally, also in case of health 
benefits we may rather expect synergies with equity indicators as poorer and vulnerable 
persons are more at risk both regarding death and disability. As well, the number of 
beneficiaries should positively relate to the life years saved.  
 
Table 6: Trade-off and synergies between indicators on a theoretical basis  
  
 
 
Cost-effectiveness  
Absolute wealth 
in USD 
Relative wealth 
(livelihoods saved) 
Health benefits 
(DALYs) 
 
Eq
u
ity
 
 
Vulnerability index 
(Barr et al., 2010) Likely trade-off Likely synergy Rather synergy 
 
 
Poorest countries 
(GDP p.c.) Likely trade-off Likely synergy Rather synergy 
 
 
Beneficiaries per USD Likely trade-off Likely synergy Likely synergy  
 
 
 
Table 7 displays how well the hypotheses made before are reflected by our sample of 16 
projects submitted to the AFB in 2011. Regarding absolute wealth saved the expected trade-
off with vulnerability and poverty of a country is occurring. As well, consistent with our 
theoretical considerations, the relative wealth savings do positively correlate with all equity 
indicators. Finally, in case of health benefits, we see an unexpected trade-off with 
vulnerability and poverty but this result should be cautiously interpreted as it mainly relies on 
health savings mentioned by one project. Even when the sample size is small (N=16, often 
N=15 due to missing data), some of the correlation coefficients are significant. The results for 
vulnerability are approximately the same for both the Barr et al. (2010) and the Global 
                                               
33
 While poverty and vulnerability are distinct concepts, have different drivers and not all adaptation 
measures address both (Eriksen and O'Brien, 2007), there is substantial overlap in practice as less-
affluent people often suffer from wealth and wealth losses and have less capacity to recover (Kahn, 
2005; Eriksen and O'Brien, 2007)  
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Adaptation Institute (2011) vulnerability index, while the Buys et al. (2009) indicator shows 
correlation close to zero. 
 
Table 7: Correlation between project approval & cost-effectiveness criteria  
 
 
 
Cost-effectiveness 
Absolute wealth 
in USD 
Relative wealth 
(livelihoods 
saved) 
Health benefits 
(DALYs) 
RANK RANK RANK 
Eq
u
ity
 
 
Vulnerabilit. 
index (Barr et 
al., 2010) 
R
A
N
K 
-0.57** 0.37 -0.12 
Poorest coun-
tries (GDP 
p.c.) 
R
A
N
K 
-0.38* 0.53** -0.24 
Beneficiaries 
per USD 
R
A
N
K 
-0.10 0.71*** 0.25 
 
N=15, Spearman product moment correlation coefficients. * = significant at 0.01 level, ** = significant at 0.05 level, 
*** = significant at 0.1 level, 
 
 
 
6 Conclusions  
 
This paper has examined which equity and cost-effectiveness indicators could be used for 
selecting projects in multilateral adaptation funding. Furthermore, it has analyzed whether 
there are synergies or trade-offs between equity and cost-effectiveness. The theoretical 
analysis has been complemented by analyzing 16 project documents from the Adaptation 
Fund (AF) as major multilateral funding institution. 
 
First of all, we have found it quite challenging to define universally acceptable equity and 
cost-effectiveness indicators, as neither the academic literature nor policy documents give 
clear guidance on when adaptation funding is equitable and cost-effective. We have selected 
three indicators for each principle that corresponds to both concepts in the literature (e.g. 
equality and leximin for equity; monetary and non-monetary benefits for cost-effectiveness) 
and to the scarce AF policy guidance (support for the most vulnerable; social, economic and 
environmental benefits). As equity indicators, we chose vulnerability, income level as proxy 
for poverty and number of beneficiaries per dollar. The cost-effectiveness indicators selected 
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were economic savings absolute and relative as well as human lives saved, all per dollar of 
funding,  
 
When applying these indicators to 16 adaptation fund projects, we find that the AFB has 
rather approved projects from high-income and less vulnerable countries with high absolute 
wealth savings, while not approving projects in poor, vulnerable countries with high relative 
economic savings. These patterns are clearly in contradiction with the final goal of the AFB to 
mainly support countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. It has to be noted 
that data constraints forced us to look at country level indicators, while we were not able to 
assess vulnerability at the community level, as demanded by the AFB project review criteria. 
Future analysis, both academic and conducted by the AFB, will have to address both the 
country and community/project level. Furthermore, we cannot guarantee that our assessment 
is valid beyond the particular equity indicators selected and analyzed. This is a particular 
relevant limitation as neither negotiators at the UNFCCC level nor the AFB have been able to 
agree on a set of indicators.  
 
Regarding the relationship between equity and cost-effectiveness, our results show that 
there is not necessarily a high trade-off between the two, which can both be supported by 
theory and empirical data. From a theoretical point of view, we can argue that only a pure 
economic indicator for cost-effectiveness is probably in contradiction with equity principles, 
while other cost-effectiveness indicators based on human health and relative economic 
measures may be compatible with equity principles. To put it differently, if the definition of 
cost-effectiveness is simply to achieve a specific equity measure (e.g. reducing vulnerability 
of the poorest) at least costs, we would even see perfect synergies. Our ideas are supported 
by the data on the 16 analysed adaptation fund projects: while absolute economic savings 
are negatively correlated with vulnerability, poverty and number of beneficiaries, the relative 
economic measure, which is theoretically closer to vulnerability, is positively correlated to all 
of these three equity indicators.  
 
Our results clearly have some limitations: first of all, we analyzed three easily understandable 
equity and cost-effectiveness indicators, which implied simplifications, neglecting of 
potentially relevant indicators and also value judgments. Therefore, it may be warranted to 
test the stability of our results by applying other or refined indicators for equity and cost-
effectiveness, while also analyzing further goals of adaptation finance (e.g. legitimacy34). 
Furthermore, we only applied our framework to 16 AFB projects. It would be interesting to 
                                               
34
 For an overview of potential criteria for evaluating adaptation policies beyond economic efficiency, 
see Oberlack and Neumärker (2011) and Adger et al. (2005). 
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see if the observed results are also valid beyond the AFB, including other bilateral and 
multilateral channels. As last limitation, the data availability and quality involves uncertainty, 
particularly on the cost-effectiveness side. Improving data quality would require elaboration 
of methodologies on how to measure the mentioned (or other) indicators. Such 
methodologies would also have to define whether development benefits beyond expected 
climate damages are included in the cost-effectiveness assessment. Given the limitations in 
data and human capacity, it will be a substantial challenge to develop meaningful but simple 
methodologies35.  
. 
What do our results imply for the operations of the AFB? First of all, the AFB may have to 
elaborate more detailed criteria for the technical review36, provide additional guidance to 
implementing entities on how to show compliance with these criteria, and make public the 
technical review and the reason for the final decision. While this may not have been very 
relevant in the past given the availability of sufficient funding, the AFB may have to be more 
selective in allocation of funding in the future (e.g. in the context of the 50% cap of funding to 
Multilateral Implementing Entities). 
 
Second, if past approval decisions are related to the capacity of countries and implementing 
entities to develop well-written proposals, as discussed above, then capacity development for 
both National and Multilateral Implementing Entities, as well as the support for collection of 
relevant data, may be as important as deciding on concrete review and allocation criteria. 
 
Third, the AFB may look for ways to find synergies between equity and cost-effectiveness, 
even when cost-effectiveness is defined in purely economic terms. Following the suggestions 
of Blank (2002), the AFB may consider the following areas as fruitful for potential synergies: 
interventions with long-term benefits (e.g. flexible infrastructure and information on climate 
change), creating adaptive capacity within communities and countries with low capacity and 
incentive-based systems37. Interestingly, most of these suggestions (flexibility, capacity and 
long-term orientation) are quite similar to the ones of Hallegatte (2009) and Fankhauser and 
Burton (2011). 
                                               
35
 Such methodologies will not only have to cover the mean case but also a wide range of potential 
scenarios as timing, duration and extent of climatic hazards are often uncertain or unknown.  
36 This step is already considered, see AFB (2011a) 
37
 An incentive-based system creates incentives to socially desirable behaviour, e.g. conserving water, 
soil and protecting forests. As example, tradable water rights with initial equal per capita allocation 
would be such a incentive-based system that is both in accordance with equity (as each person has 
the same rights) and efficiency (as there are incentives to conserve water), see Rosegrant and 
Binswanger (1994), In practice, setting up the right legal and institutional frameworks alongside 
building social capacity will be required for successful implementation in developing countries 
(Bjornlund and McKay, 2002) 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of projects in the sample 
 
 Country Name Fun-ding 
Number 
of bene-
ficiaries*  
Imple-
menting 
agency 
Date of 
Appro-
val  
Date of 
docu-
ment 
   
in  
Mn $  
(direct / 
indirect)  
(all in 
2011) 
(all in 
2011) 
Belize Belize Marine Conservation and Climate Adaptation Initiative $10.0 8000 WB - Sep 
Cook 
Islands 
Strengthening the Resilience of our 
Islands and our Communities to 
Climate Change  
$5.4 6000 UNDP Dec Sep 
Ecuador 
Enhancing Resilience of Communities 
to the adverse effects of climate 
change on food security 
$7.5 200,000 WFP Mar Mar 
Egypt  
Building Resilient Food Security 
Systems to Benefit the Southern 
Egypt Region 
$7.3 100,000 WFP - Sep 
Eritrea 
CC Adaptation Programme In Water 
And Agriculture In Anseba Region, 
Eritrea 
$6.5 24,000 / 68,000 UNDP Mar Mar 
Georgia  
Developing Climate Resilient Flood & 
Flash Flood Management Practices 
To Protect Vulnerable Communities  
$5.3 200,000 UNDP Dec Sep 
Mada-
gascar  
Promoting Climate Resilience in the 
Rice Sector $4.6 
30,000 / 
125,000 UNEP Dec Sep 
Mali 
Programme Support for CC 
Adaptation in the vulnerable regions 
of Mopti and Timbouctou 
$8.5 400,000 UNDP - Sep 
Maurita-
nia (1) 
Coastal Weather and Climate Hazard 
Early Warning System for Mauritania $4.2  WMO - Sep 
Maurita-
nia  (2) 
Enhancing Resilience of Commu-
nities to the Adverse Effects of Cli-
mate Change on Food Security  
$10.0 375,000 WFP - Sep 
Mauritius 
Climate Change Adaptation 
Programme In the Coastal Zone of 
Mauritius 
$9.1 3,000 UNDP Sep Sep 
Papua 
New 
Guinea 
Enhancing adaptive capacity of 
communities in Papua New Guinea to 
climate change and disaster risks  
$8.8 152,000 UNDP - Sep 
Samoa 
Enhancing resilience of coastal 
communities of Samoa to climate 
change 
$8.7 60,000 UNDP Dec Sep 
Solomon 
Islands 
Enhancing resilience of commu-nities 
to the adverse effects of CC in 
agriculture & food security 
$5.5 125,000 UNDP Mar Mar 
Tanzania  
Implementation of Concrete 
Adaptation Measures to Reduce 
vulnerability of Livelihood … 
$9.8 160,000 UNEP Dec Sep 
Uruguay Buiding resilience to climate in Vulnerable Smallholders $7.0 
1340/ 
4500 National Dec Mar 
 
* Data on number of beneficiaries as stated in the project proposal documents are uncertain. There are no 
guidelines on how to estimate number of beneficiaries, including what minimum level of benefits or ‘directness’ of 
benefits to consider. 
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Appendix 2: Most vulnerable countries according to different indices  
 
Country 
Overall vulnerability 
index, rank (1=most 
vulnerable) (n=131)  
Vulnerability index, 
(inverted) ranks 
(1=most vulnerable) 
(n=187) 
Impact vulnerability 
index (1=most 
vulnerable) (n=168) 
 
(Barr et al., 2010) (Global Adaptation 
Institute, 2011) 
(Buys et al., 2009) 
Belize 78 87 4 
Cook Islands - - - 
Ecuador 57 151 20 
Egypt 40 144 116 
Eritrea 3 36 14 
Georgia 101 126 63 
Madagascar 45 25 29 
Mali 30 13 65 
Mauritania 1 8 19 1 
Mauritania 2 8 19 1 
Mauritius 96 132 - 
Papua New G. 44 33 95 
Samoa 76 63 - 
Solomon Islands 56 28 - 
Tanzania 38 17 71 
Uruguay 128 170 87 
 
 
Appendix 3:  Correlation between approval and different vulnerability indices 
 
 approval
YN 
Vuln. Index 
Barr (2010) 
Vuln. Index 
GAI (2011) 
Vuln. Index 
Buys(2009) 
GDP per 
capita 
No. of be-
neficiaries 
approvalYN 1.00     
 
 
Vuln. Index 
Barr (2010) 0.44* 1.00     
Vuln. Index 
GAI (2011) 0.32 0.70*** 1.00    
Vuln. Index 
Buys (2009) 0.10 0.35 0.25 1.00   
GDP per 
capita 0.20 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.16 1.00  
No. of be-
neficiaries -0.36 -0.50* -0.51* -0.10 -0.50 1.00 
 
Spearman’s rank-ordered correlation coefficients 
* = significant at 0.01 level, ** = significant at 0.05 level, *** = significant at 0.1 level, 
N=15, except for Vuln. Index Buys (N=12) and GDP (N=16) 
